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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CONNIE LOU SWITZER, RAYMONE 
GORDON SWITZER, DONALD EUGENE 
SWITZER, RODNEY DEAN SWITZER, 
and THEREASE JO SWITZER, minors I 
by and through their Guardian ad 
litem, LOUELLA R. BOWLES, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
v. 
BRYCE C. REYNOLDS, individually 
and formerly doing business as 
REYNOLDS SAND AND GRAVEL COMPANY; 
CLARK EQUIPMENT COMPANY, Construc-
tion Machinery Division, and 
FOULGER EQUIPMENT COMPANY, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Case No. 15712 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
Appeal from Judgment of Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, Utah 
Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge 
John H. Allen, Esq. 
800 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84113 
Attorney for Respondent Reynolds 
Richard H. Moffat, Esq. 
9th Floor Tribune Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
c. R. Henriksen, Esq. 
Jcel H. Dembinsky, Esq. 
320 South Fifth East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Attorney for Respondent Clark Equipment Company 
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STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This action is for the wrongful death of Gordon Switzer 
who died as the result of an accident on June 24, 1963, and is 
brought pursuant to Section 78-11-7 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended. Mr. Switzer was killed while operating a Model 175A, 
Clark Michigan Front End Loader (the loader) • This suit was 
brought by Louella R. Switzer Bowles, the widow of the deceased 
on behalf of the five Switzer Children. 
At the time of the death of their father, all five children 
were minors, ranging in age from one month to 6-1/2 years. Suit 
was brought against Bryce C. Reynolds, (Reynolds), formerly doing 
business as Reynolds Sand and Gravel, the employer of the decedent, 
and owner of the loader; Foulger Equipment Company, (Foulger) as 
the seller to Reynolds of the loader; and Clark Equipment Company, 
(Clark) the manufacturer of the loader. On September 7, 1977, 
plaintiffs and Foulger settled their differences and a stipulation 
and order of dismissal with prejudice was entered. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Suit was filed on October 23, 1974. From that date until 
October 3, 1977, intensive discovery was conducted by the plaintiffs 
in preparing their case for trial. During that nearly three-year 
period, 17 depositions were taken, numerous motions were argued 
before the court and the case had been set for trial four times. 
the last of which was October 3, 1977. Plaintiff was ordered at one 
of those hearings to pay the full amount of defendant's costs and 
attorney's fees of $70.00 per hour in connection with certain dis-
covery which effectively prevented plaintiffs' discovery and 
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notice of intent to appeal was filed. The court failed to rule 
on plaintiffs' motions for costs and attorney's fees in connecti: 
with two motions to compel discovery against Clark Equipment 
Company. On August 15, 1977, Clark Equipment Company filed a 
Motion to Dismiss based on the ground that plaintiffs' cause of 
action expired by the Statute of Limitations, Section 78-12-28, 
U.C.A. (1953; as amended). On August 31, 1977 defendant Reynold: 
filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that there wa: 
no genuine issue as to any material fact. On September 7, 1977, 
defendant Reynolds filed a brief in support of his Motion to Dis· 
miss alleging that the defendant committed no acts of negligence, 
that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations and that 
the plaintiffs' claim has been discharged in bankruptcy. Argume: 
was had on thepending motions on September 16, 1977, and on Janu: 
17, 1978, the judge granted defendants' motions. Plaintiffs ~e 
appealed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs/Appellants seek reversal of the District Court': 
surrunary judgment and, ruling on motions and remand for trial on 
the merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 24, 1963, Gordodon Switzer was an adult male, in''. 
heal th and working for Bryce C. Reynolds, formerly doing busine: 
as Reynolds Sand & Gravel Company. He was instructed to drive: 
Clark Equipment Company front-end loader, Model 17 SA, (the loade 
down the State Highway in Parley's Canyon from a point near Kirr~ 
Junction to Reynolds' main pit in Salt Lake City. Just above~ 
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Mountain Dell Reservoir Dam the machine tipped over on Switzer, 
killing him almost instantaneously. The only eye witness to 
the incident, Mr. Jack Thompson, testified that he was driving 
slowly uphill at the time, that he saw the incident clearly and 
that Gordon Switzer appeared to have no problem with the machine 
but that he drove it across the highway and that the machine then 
tipped over •. 
Shortly after Switzer's death, a claim was filed with the 
Utah State Industrial Commission, Workmen's Compensation Division, 
but the Department determined that Bryce C.Reynolds, the employer, 
was not covered. Shortly before Switzer's death, the defendant 
Reynolds had been operating under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act. 
He subsequently amended his petition to include a claim by Louella 
R. Switzer. Suit was filed on October 23, 1974 by Louella R. 
Switzer Bowles as guardian ad litem for the five minor children of 
the decedent. Reynolds filed an answer alleging discharge in bank-
ruptcy and the running of the statute of limitations, Section 70A-
12-28, U.C.A. (1953, as amended). Clark filed an answer alleging 
the statute of limitations had run but did not allege any specific 
section of the Utah Code. 
Motions were argued on September 16, 1977, and on January 
17, 1978, the judge entered his order. Plaintiffs urged the court 
to consider the long-pending motion for the award of attorney's 
fees and expenses in connection with certain discovery compelled 
from Clark Equipment Company. The judge declined to rule on the 
motion, granted summary judgment for defendants, and this appeal 
was instituted. 
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A R G U M E N T 
POINT I. 
THERE IS A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AND IT WAS 
ERROR TO GRANT DEFENDANT REYNOLDS' AND CLARK'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 56(c) UTAH RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Rule 56 (_c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in per-
tinent part: 
the judgment sought shall be rendered forth-
with if the pleadings, depositions, answers to Inter-
rogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue of fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. 
Before summary judgment can be properly granted, it is 
necessary that judgment be free from doubt and that as a remed1, 
summary judgment should be granted with great caution. Green v, 
Garm, 11 Ut.2d 375, 359 P.2d,1050; Henry v. Washiki Club, Inc. 
11 Ut. 2d 1138, 355 P.2d 973; Watkins v.Simmons, 11 Ut. 2d 46, • 
P.2d 852. 
The plaintiffs' theory of liability against defendants CL 
and Reynolds specifically stated in their answers to Clark's a~: 
Reynolds' interrogatories supplemented answers which were serve: 
on the 8th day of February, 1977, provides in pertinent part: 
Defects in the design of the brake system in providing 
inadequate brake capacity, failure to provide fail-safe 
system; design of the steering system in creating a 
vehicle which was apparently unstable under certain 
conditions; failure to provide fail safe power steering 
assist systems; failure to provide warnings to operators 
of the brake and steering defect design deficiency; 
failure to provide adequate roll-over protective struc-
tures .... 
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The answer continues: 
(a) Inadequate brake capacity or inadequate power 
brake assist for the tractor's shovels intended 
foreseeable and actual use. 
(b) Inadequate power steering assist for excessive 
effort unless engine speed was kept up. 
(c) Design of engine declutching mechanism which 
operates whenever brakes are applied. Effect 
of said mechanism is to: Eliminate engine 
braking, reduce power steering assist by re-
duction of engine speed, enhance power steering 
pump speed; reduce power brake assist by reduc-
tion in engine speed, enhance power brake vacuum 
speed, and ... 
(g) Failure to provide warnings to the operator of the 
above defects; 
(h) Failure to provide adequate instructions to the 
operator about emergency situations and in parti-
cular about defect (c) above. 
(i) Failure to restrict use of vehicle to its safe 
uses. 
In addition, as to Reynolds, the answers state: 
(j) Violation of Utah Statute: 41-6-111, Coasting 
Prohibited; 41-6-117 Vehicle in Unsafe Condi-
tion; 41-6-144 Brake Equipment; 41-6-155 Re-
quirement that Vehicle be in Safe Mechanical 
Condition; 35-1-12 Places of Employment to be 
Safe; 35-1-46 Failure to Secure compensation; 
and 35-1-57 Non-Compliance-Penalty. 
The primary thrust of liability against defendant Reynolds 
is because of Reynolds' failure to have in effect at the time of 
Switzer's death workmen's compensation insurance. That failure 
reverses the normal burden of proof and makes the defendant prove 
he was not negligent. Section 35-1-57, u.c.A. (1953, as amended), 
above, states in pertinent part: 
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In any such action the defendant shall not avail himsei: 
of any of the following defenses: Defense of the fella·,. 
servant rule; Defense of assumption of risk or the defer.: 
of contributory negligence. Proof of the injury shall~ 
stitute prima facie evidence of negligence on the parts' 
the employer to show freedom from negligence resulting~: 
such injury. 
Reynolds has adrni tted that Gordon Switzer was employed t 
at the time of his death and that he was acting in the scope o: 
employment. Based on the presumption created by failure to sec 
workmen's compensation, it is the duty of Reynolds to show tha: 
was not negligent. The affidavits which Reynolds submitted dm 
only with the operation of the machine subsequent to the accide 
The affidavits submitted are not inconsistent with plaintiff's: 
of design defects in the brake and steering system, and certak 
not reach the standard of proof required for the granting of s~ 
mary judgment. The evidence on file clearly shows, or indicat:' 
that the machine in question, even if properly maintained, couL 
not comply with Utah statutes dealing with brake performance. 
As specifically alleged, the brake equipment was not capat 
meeting the standard set by Section 41-6-144, U.C.A. (1953, as 
amended). The section provides that for any motor vehicle oper· 
ated upon a highway shall be equipped with brakes adequate to 
control the movement of and to stop and hold vehicle. For the 
loader which weighed some 24,000 pounds, a stopping distance of 
40 feet or a deceleration of 14 feet per second or the equiva~ 
braking force in percentage of vehicle or combination weight of 
43.5%. And yet, Walter Black, the chief safety engineer for 
Clark, testified that even at 1500 pounds per square inch in Wo 
braking system and 175 pounds on the brake pedal, the machiM 
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would only stop at 8 feet per second, about half of the statutory 
minimum. Moreover, Clark's own information provided in response 
to discovery, namely, their Drawing No. KXB-76462 shows a 1500 pounds 
per square inch is the maximum which the brake system is capable. 
Thus, Clark's own expert has testified the brakes were only about 
half as good as the minimum legal requirement. Moreover, the defect 
in the brake system is corroborated by the deposition of Mr. Keith 
Perry. At the relevant period in time, Mr. Perry was a service 
manager of the defendant Foulger Equipment Company. Mr. Perry testi-
fied that he was in charge of maintaining this machine and that it 
was reconditioned. He testified further that the machine had all 
required service done on it and that Clark Equipment Company's parts 
and procedures and methods were used at all times. Mr. Perry fur-
ther testified that he checked the brakes approximately one week 
before and one week after the accident and that everything on this 
machine appeared to be okay but that it was incapable of skidding 
the tires on dry pavement. The evidence on file further shows 
that there were no skid marks at the point where the machine tipped 
over. 
Plaintiff has also alleged that the steering design was 
defective. The defects exist on all similar machines even if 
properly maintained. The loader had power steering which used 
an engine-driven pump to force hydraulic oil into a steering 
cylinder. One defect was a pump which was too small and used 
excessive steering effort to steer the loader at low vehicle 
speeds. A second and concealed defect is a declutching valve in 
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the transmission. When the brakes are used the brake pressure 
automatically shifts the machine into neutral, declutching the 
engine from the wheels. This is described in the Clark Operat: 
Manual No. 1169 in Section 200, pages 2 and 3: 
This valve is connected to the brake system master cylfoc, 
by a hydraulic line. When the wheel brakes are applied, 
brake fluid enters the valve and overcomes the spring 
force. This force is to slide to shift over and block 
pressure from entering the directional clutches. In this 
manner a "neutral" is established without moving the con· 
trol levers. 
When Switzer stepped on the brakes as Jack Thompson's de~· 
sition indicates, the steering effort became excessive, causir.: 
or contributing to Switzer's death. There is no evidence that 
defendant Reynolds furnished any warnings to Switzer of either 
these defects and since it is his duty under the presumption er; 
under the workmen's compensation law to prove he was free from 
negligence, it is improper to grant summary judgment. 
It is a policy of law to favor trial on the merits and to 
afford both sides full opportunity to present their evidence ar.: 
citations as to disputed issues so they may be disposed of on s~ 
stantial rather than technical grounds. McKean v. Mountain Vie .. 
Memorial Estates, 17 Ut.2d 323, 411 P.2d 129 (1966). 
When the burden of proof is shifted to Reynolds, the stat: 
stopping distance, the deposition of Clark's own expert, thed( 
si tion of Keith Perry, and the inference that Switzer was free' 
negligence, are construed together, it is apparent that a genu1: 
issue of material fact does exist for submission to the jury. 
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POINT II. 
DEFENDANTS CLARK AND REYNOLDS ARE BARRED AND ESTOPPED 
FROM ASSERTING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BECAUSE OF 
FAILURE TO PLEAD THE PROPER SECTION OF THE UTAH CODE 
IN A TIMELY MANNER. 
Neither defendant Clark nor defendant Reynolds have pleaded 
the appropriate statutory section in their answer. Defendant Clark 
in their answer pled only that the plaintiffs' claim was barred by 
the Utah Code and cited no statutory section. Defendant Reynolds 
pled specifically that plaintiffs' claim was barred by Section 
70-12-28, U.C.A. (1953 as amended). If any statute of limitations 
applies it would be Section 78-12-28 U.C.A. (1953, as amended). 
Utah law is settled on this point. The statute must be pleaded. 
Tanner v. Provo Reservoir Co., 78 Ut. 158, 2 P.2d 107; Utah Delaware 
Mining Co., v. Industrial Conunission, 76 Ut. 187, 289 P.94. More-
over, Utah holds that the statute must be pleaded in proper time and 
manner and that only the section pleaded is effective and further 
that if the statute is not pleaded correctly it cannot be relied 
on. American Theater Co. v. Glasmann, 95 Ut. 303, 80 P.2d 922. 
Also in accord is In Re Linfords' Estate, 207 P.2d 1033, 
where the court overruled the lower court's sustention of a 
demurrer, stating at page 1034: 
It has long been the law in the state that a 
demurrer on the ground that the cause of action 
is barred by the statute of limitations which does 
not state the section of the code relied upon is 
insufficient. 
Furthermore, neither defendant has not plead the statute 
of limitations with sufficient clarity to identify the section 
and subsection relied upon as required by Rule 9 (h) Utah Rules 
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of Civil Procedure, because of the inadequate plea, it should 
not, therefore, be considered on appeal. Wasatch Mines Compar.;' 
v. Hopkinson, 465 P.2d 1007. 
In pleading the statute of limitations, it is not necess: 
to state the facts showing the defense but it may be alleged;; 
ally that the cause of action.is barred by the provisions of e 
statute relied upon, referring to or describing such statute s;, 
fically and definitely by section number, subsection designati: 
if any, or otherwise designating the provision relied upon suf: 
clearly to identify it. If such allegation is controverted, ~ 
party pleading the statute must establish, on the trial, the fr 
showing that the cause of action is so barred. 
From the foregoing, it is apparent that neither Clark nor 
Reynolds can rely upon the statute of limitations. 
In addition, equitable estoppel in a proper case may be 
invoked to prevent defendants from relying on the statute. Thro. 
almost three years of discovery and court hearing, neither dek· 
dant acted to have the plaintiffs' Complaint dismissed for run:. 
of the statute of limitations. This case has been unduly cornpl0 
costly, and time consuming. Through all of this, and after 
three trial settings, the defendants still did not act to asser: 
their alleged right. In fact, it was not until six weeks befor' 
the fourth trial date that defendants filed their motion and nc: 
until two weeks prior to trial that the motions were argued. 
Had the trial not been vacated for other problems with the 
docket, the two-week scheduled trial would have been had. Clear: 
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this is not the purpose of the statute of limitations. Further-
more, previous orders of the court indicated that the parties 
were to take all proper steps to dispose of the case as soon as 
possible. Quoting in pertinent part from an order of the court 
dated April 29, 1976, almost a year and a half prior to the court 
trial setting: 
certain parties have not acted expedi-
di tiously to move this matter towards trial." 
It is clear the statute of limitations is an affirmative 
defense which must be brought to the attention of the court in 
a timely and appropriate manner. The doctrine of equitable 
estoppel has been recognized in several cases. In the case of 
Weir v. Bauer, 75 Ut. 498, 286 P. 936, the court recognized the 
doctrine in a case of a corporation with a large stockholder. 
The doctrine was also recognized in the case of Rice v. Granite 
School District, 23 Ut.2d 22, 456 P.2d 159, involving the injury 
due to a fall from a bleacher. Reversing a motion for summary 
judgment for defendant the court said that plaintiff's failure to 
act in a timely manner was due to wrongful representations and 
misleading statements of the defendants. Again the doctrine 
was recognized in the case of Whitaker v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
522 P.2d 1252. The court upheld the doctrine even though it 
was the plaintiff's attorney who was lulled into inaction. In 
this case, the plaintiffs have expended vast al!lounts of time and 
money in preparing their case for trial and through all of this 
in the numerous court hearings the defendants have not acted to 
move forward their motion based on the affirmative defense of the 
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statute of limitations. Clearly, where there is an affirmati'; 
duty to bring the statute of limitations to the court's atten: 
in a timely manner, the failure to do so should invoke the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel. 
POINT III. 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM HAS NOT BEEN DISCHARGED IN BANKRUPTCY 
A. Statement of Facts: 
Reynolds' petition in bankruptcy was filed on May 2, 1% 
and Reynolds was discharged in bankruptcy on August 30, 1968. 
Plaintiffs' claim arose on the date of Gordon Switzer's death· 
a claim for benefits with Utah State Industrial Commission on 
July 6, 1963. Plaintiffs commenced this action against Reyno),' 
in October 1974. 
Title II, Section 35 of the Bankruptcy Act provides that 
A discharge in bankruptcy releases a bankrupt 
from all his provable debts. 
Title II, Section 103 lists the debts which may be pr~~ 
and allowed against a bankrupt's estate - said act provides in 
part as follows: 
A-1 "A fixed liability, as evidenced by a 
judgment or an instrument in writing abso-
lutely owing at the time of the filing of 
the petition by or against him, whether then 
payable or not, with any interest thereon 
which would have been recoverable at the 
date or with a rebate of interest when such 
as were not then payable and did not bear 
interest .. 
A-5 "Provable debts reduced to judgments 
after the filing of the petition and before 
the consideration of the bankrupt's appli-
cation for a discharge, less costs incurred 
and interest accrued after the filing of the 
petition and before the consideration of the 
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bankrupt's application for a discharge, less 
costs incurred and interest accrued after the 
filing of the petition and up to the time of 
the entry of such judgments." 
A-6 "An award of an industrial accident com-
mission, body, or officer of any state having 
jurisdiction to make awards of workmen's com-
pensation in case of injury or death from 
injury, if such injury occurred prior to ad-
judication." 
A-7 "The right to recover damages in any 
action for negligence instituted prior to 
and pending at the time of the filing of the 
petitionin bankruptcy. " 
On the date Reynolds filed a petition in bankruptcy and on the 
date of adjudication and discharge,· no action had been commenced 
for the recovery of damages by plaintiffs. An unliquidated claim 
with the Industrial Commission was pending on the date of adjudi-
cation only. 
Unliquidated claims for tort are not provable in bankruptcy. 
Pindel v. Holgate (CA9) 221 F. 342; 
Talcott v. Friend (CA7) 179 F 676, 
affd 228 U.S. 27, 57 L. Ed. 718, 33 
S. Ct. 505; Brown v. United Button Co. 
(CA 3) 149 F. 48; Poznanovic v. Gilardine, 
174 Minn. 89, 218 N.W. 244, 57 A.L.R. 148; 
Winfree v. Jones, 104 Va 39, 51 SE 153; 
11) A.L.R. 851. 
Only provable debts are discharged in bankruptcy: 
Crawford v. Burke, 195 U.S. 176, 49 L. 
Ed. 147, 25 s. Ct 9; Audubon v. Shufeldt, 
181 U.S. 575, 45 L. Ed. 1009, 21 S. Ct 735. 
Friend v. Talcott, 228 U.S. 27, 57 L. Ed. 
718, 33 S. Ct 505, affd (CA 7) 179 F. 676; 
Crawford v. Burke, 195 U.S. 176, 49 L. Ed. 
147, 25 s. Ct 9; Brookhaven Bank & Trust Co. 
v. Gwin (CA 5 Miss), 253 F. 2d 17; Eastman 
v. Hibbard, 54 NH 504. 
Brown v. O'Keefe, 300 U.S. 598, 81 L. Ed. 827, 
57 S. Ct 543. 
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As an exception thereto, the Bankruptcy Act, Section 6J 
makes provable debts of the bankrupt founded upon the right '. 
damages in any action for negligence v,rhere the action is .ins: 
prior to and pending at the time of the filing of the petitio: 
bankruptcy. 
Neither this action, nor the claim filed with the Indus: 
mission were instituted and pending prior or pending when 
Reynolds filed in bankruptcy on May 2, 1963. The earliest~ 
a claim for damages in negligence could have been instituted, 
June 24, 1963. The claim filed with the Industrial Commissior 
never processed to conclusion and no award was ever made and. 
was unliquidated. 
A tort claim is not provable (and therefore not dischar: 
able) unless it falls within a specific statutory category (Se 
tion 63 (A) (7}). 
Goldsmith v. Overseas Scientific Corp. 
(PC N4l 188 F. Supp. 530. 
A claim which is not provable because it is not in exist, 
at the time of filing of the petition in bankruptcy is not dis· 
charged. 
Brown v. O'Keefe, 300 U.S. 598, 81 L. Ed. 
827, 57 S. Ct 543. 
In addition, the Swi tzers' claim was not discharged beca. 
of Reynolds' failure to properly schedule the Swi tzers' addres: 
and therefore give notice of the bankruptcy proceeding. Tit!' 
II, Section 25 of the Bankruptcy Act provides in pertinent ~r 
. (8) prepare, make oath to, and file in court 
within five days after adjudication, if an involuntary 
bankrupt, and with his petition, if a voluntary bank-
rupt, a schedule of his property, the location thereof 
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and its money value, in detail; and a list of all his 
creditors, including all persons asserting contingent 
unliquidated, or disputed claims, showing their resi-
dence or places of business, if known, or if unknown 
that fact to be stated . (emphasis added) 
Yet in Reynolds' amended schedule of September 15, 1965, the 
address of the Switzers is given as: 
c/o Industrial Commission of Utah 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
While the address given may have been sufficient to dis-
charge a claim by the Industrial Commission, it is not as to 
Switzers. In point of fact, Mrs. Switzer listed her address as 
3211 South Second West, Salt Lake City, Utah in July 6, 1963, 
when she filed application with the Industrial Commission. Sub-
sequent correspondence with the Industrial Commission indicates 
an address of 477 Moore, Pontiac, Michigan, on January 11, 1965. 
In September 1965 Reynolds did not send notice to either the 
correct city or state. Such defective notice is ineffective as 
to the Swi tzers. 
Bucci v. LaRocca, 21 N.J. 316, 33 ATL (2d) 878; 
Van Denburgh v. Goodfellow, 19 Col. (2d) 217, 
120 P.2d 20; Salmon v. Sarno, 37 N.Y. 2d 870. 
POINT IV. 
PLAINTIFFS WERE PREVENTED NECESSARY DISCOVERY BY 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER AND BY FAILURE OF THE TRIAL 
COURT TO RULE ON MOTIONS TO AWARD PLAINTIFFS THEIR 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
A. Statement of Facts: 
On August 27, 1976, plaintiffs served upon defendant Clark 
interrogatories and a request for production numbered 18 through 
23. On October 14, 1976, Clark served its answers and partial 
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response to plaintiffs' request for production. In answer to 
No. 19, Clark objected to the production for inspection and 
copying of records on all loaders similar to the one involved 
in this lawsuit on the grounds that the request for production 
was too burdensome. Pursuant to motion and notice of hearing 
served December 10, 1976, hearing was had before the Honorable 
Marcellus K. Snow on December 17, 1976 on request No. 19 and 
several other matters. Due to the length of the file, Judge s~c 
declined to rule on plaintiffs' motion. Clark did furnish certa 
other information which re so 1 ved the other problems. Plain tiff: 
motion was again noticed for hearing on February 11, 1977 at a 
scheduled pretrial conference. The pretrial conference was not 
had. The unresolved motion was again brought to the court's at· 
tention on March 30,' 1977, and on May 7, 1977. On May 25, 197i, 
plaintiffs' motion was finally denied with leave to resubmit. 
On May 27, 1977 the motion was argued again and plaintiff was pe 
mi tted the inspection provided that they pay to Clark their att 
ney's fees in advance - $70.00 an hour. On June 16, 1977, plair· 
tiffs filed notice of preservation of rights on appeal. In add: 
on September 16, 1977, plaintiffs served upon defendant Clark a 
demand for production of certain documents which would include: 
records referred to above. Clark objected to the demand for pre 
duction and argument was had on the demand on that date. The 
court considered the matter but did not rule on it. 
A second matter relating to discovery concerns the de~­
s i tions of Walter L. Black and M. L. Conrad, the former being' 
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present employee of Clark and the latter being a former employee 
of Clark. Plaintiffs noticed up the depositions of the two in-
dividuals at Benton Harbor, Michigan, the home office of Clark, 
for June 27, 1977. On May 12, 1977, Clark filed a motion for 
protective order asking for, among other things, that said dis-
covery may be had only upon plaintiffs paying the cost of trans-
portation and per diem for the defendant Clark Equipment Company's 
attorney to attend a taping of said deposition in Benton Harbor, 
Michigan. The motion was noticed up for May 25, 1977, and at the 
hearing on that date, plaintiffs were ordered to pay Clark that 
travel expense in advance. Following the hearing of May 27, 1977, 
the protective order was modified but not in any respect altering 
the payment of travel expenses. On June 20, 1977, plaintiffs 
amended the notice of taking of depositions of Biack and Conrad 
to June 30, 1977. On June 29, 1977, ex parte and without notice, 
Clark Equipment applied to the court for a modification of the 
protective order and that modification was granted. The modifica-
tion prevented plaintiff from asking any opinions or conclusions 
of the witnesses on the basis they were not discoverable. That 
modification is not a subject of this appeal. The depositions 
were taken on June 30, 1977 pursuant to the amended notice. 
The third subject dealing with discovery is the award of 
certain costs and attorney's fees to the plaintiffs for Clark's 
failure to comply with discovery. On September 12, 1975, plain-
tiffs served upon Clark their set of interrogatories. Clark filed 
a general objection in October 1975. On April 27, 1976, the inter-
rogatories were stricken on Rule 11 motion made by defendant Clark. 
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On April 28, 1976, Clark stipulated it would answer or object 
to the stricken interrogatories within 30 days without requir: 
re-service of those interrogatories. On May 24, 1976, Clark 
served its answers but its objections were not signed by the 
attorney as required by Rule 33A. On June 10, 1976, plaintif' 
served their motion, notice and memorandum to compel defendant 
Clark to answer the interrogatories propounded by plaintiffs 
and, more specifically, to compel answers over the objections 
previously filed by Clark. Hearing was had on June 18, 1976, 
Plaintiffs submitted a 7-page memorandum in support of their 
motion. On the day scheduled for hearing, defendant Clark d~ 
not appear and plaintiffs obtained an order requiring Clark tc 
supplement their answers within 30 days. 
On July 12, 1976, Clark filed a motion to extend time to 
answer the interrogatories and noticed that up for hearing on 
August 12, 1976. That motion being supported by a 7-page memo: 
andum. Pursuant to agreement between the parties, the August 
12, 1976 hearing was continued without date and Clark subseque· 
filed a second supplemental answers to interrogatories. 
Plaintiff served another set of interrogatories on Clark 
on March 18, 1977, and when the 30 days to answer or object~ 
Plaintiffs filed its motion and 9-page memorandum for an order 
pelling Clark to answer those interrogatories on April 21, 19' 
The matter was noticed up for hearing on May 9, 1977, and at: 
time Clark stipulated it would answer the interrogatories to·. 
extent information was available and the pretrial order of thr 
date so reflects. 
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On the 18th day of July, 1977, plaintiffs filed a motion 
to determine unresolved questions prior to trial and a motion 
for protective order on their expert witness, Dr. Rudolf Limpert 
of the University of Utah. The motions were noticed for July 27, 
1977. Pursuant to the further pretrial hearings held on July 27, 
1977, the court heard arguments on plaintiffs' motions for costs 
and expenses and in paragraph 10 of that order, the court took 
under advisement its judgment on plaintiffs' motion. The trial 
court never rules on that motion. 
B. Argument: 
The general rule is that each party pay their own expenses 
unless there are some unusual circumstances which dictate transfer 
of expenses from one party to another. The court abused its dis-
cretion in awarding Clark its expenses for travel, lodging, re-
production and use of viewer, plus $70.00 per hour legal fees 
prior to taking the depositions of their experts in Benton Harbor, 
Michigan on June 30, 1977. While it is proper in certain instances 
that protective orders issued under Rule 26(c-2) may provide for 
the transfer of such expenses, exceptional circumstances are re-
quired before that is justified. In this case, these were the 
only true people the court had designated as having any knowledge 
of the subject machine. They had been requested to furnish the 
names of witnesses which would be called to trial but at that time 
and even subsequent to that time, Mr. Conrad and Mr. Black were 
the only two witnesses known to plaintiffs. Benton Harbor, Michigan 
is Clark's home office. To require plaintiffs to pay both their 
own expenses and Clark's attorney's expenses in connection with 
that motion was an abuse of discretion. 
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Stated in Continental Casualty Company v. Houdry Process 
Corp., 18 Frd 75 (1955) at page 76: 
this court has generally been reluctant 
to impose charges of this kind upon the party taking 
the depositions and will usually rule that the parties 
should bear their own expenses unless the circumstances 
are such as to indicate strongly that discretion should 
be exercised to the opposite effect." 
In making the ruling the court noted that both sides re-
quired the testimony of the witnesses. That certainly is the ca 
here since these were the only witnesses known by Clark havi~· 
direct or inside information on these particular machines. Int 
argument, Clark advanced no reasons why such expenses should be 
paid other than the fact that these witnesses did, in fact, res: 
in Benton Harbor, Michigan, but it was Clark's choice to do bus: 
ness in Utah and to submit to the jurisdiction of the Utah cour: 
Weighing the burden against a large corporation such as Clark E: 
ment against plaintiffs' financial resources, clearly there is: 
reason in equity why plaintiffs should have to bear the burden· 
Clark's expenses also. Since Rule 2 6 ( c) provides that the moti: 
of the party requiring a protective order shall show good cause, 
the court abused its discretion where Clark submitted no logica: 
reasonable or equitable reason why plaintiffs should pay the~ 
travel expenses. The court below should be ordered to reverse· 
prior order. 
Second point is that plaintiffs were effectively prevente: 
discovery of the only known records dealing with th is kind of 
machine by being ordered by the trial court to pay Clark's aU1 
$70. 00 an hour in advance to inspect certain business records:: 
Clar,. Plaintiffs made numerous efforts through interrogaton' 
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to discover information reasonably relevant to the brake and 
steering defects claimed on the type of machine in question. 
Discovery indicated that only a machine made during a relatively 
limited period of time had brake and steering systems sufficiently 
similar to the one involved in this case to be relevant to the 
type of defects claimed. 
Interrogatories were unsuccessful and the depositions of 
Messrs. Black and Conrad were also unsuccessful. It should be 
noted that the discovery of Clark on that particular machine in 
question indicated several brake defects including one prior to 
the time the machine was sold brand new where the local dealer 
changed the brake linings to a softer lining, stating that he 
was doing that on all 175A machines. Clark's only obj~ction in 
their answers to interrogatories were that such production and 
inspection would be unduly burdensome. Yet, plaintiffs offered 
to inspect those records, they offered to rent or provide their 
own microfilm viewer since Clark claimed they only had one; rent 
or provide their own office space, since Clark claimed they had 
no space; and further offered to pay the burden of all costs of 
reproducing those materials. It was further pointed out to the 
court that reservations as to the admissibility on any documents 
discovered would be reserved for later decision by the trial court. 
Clark offered no other explanation why they had to be there 
other than if plaintiff was going to be there, counsel for Clark 
was going to be there also. Nor were there any reasons advanced 
why ?laintiffs should not only bear the expense of their own agents 
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inspecting those records but also attorney for Clark being 
there since the records disclosed were voluminous. A consider-
able period of time, perhaps a week or more, would be requirec 
to inspect all of the records. The expense involved - that 1,. 
paying Clark $70.00 an hour for their attorney, effectively 
prevented plaintiffs' discovery of these records. 
Limitations, if any, on discovery are made in the form~ 
a protective order pursuant to Rule 26 (c) which provides in pe: 
tinent part as follows: 
•••• Upon motion by a party or by the person from 
whom discovery is sought, and for good cause upon the 
court in which the action is pending or alternatively, 
on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the 
district where the deposition is to be taken may make 
any order which justice requires to protect a party 
or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, 
or undue burden or expense, including one or more of 
the following: (emphasis added) 
2. That the discovery may be had only on 
specified terms and conditions, includ-
ing designation of the time or place. 
Nor is the discretion provided in Rule 26 to be exercised ligh: 
In Blankenship v. Hearst Corporation, 519 F.2d 418 (Ca 9th,~ 
at 429, the court stated: 
Under the liberal discovery principles of the 
Federal Rules defendants were required to carry a 
heavy burden of showing why discovery was denied. 
Under the facts of the present case, the defendants made 
showing whatsoever. 
In re Penn. Cent. Securities Litigation, 560 F.2d 1128 
(Ca 3, 1977) the court found it was not an abuse of discretio:, 
to order the defendant to call out names and addresses even t~c 
the computer program which would do that would cost the defend' 
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some $16,000.00. The court declined to shift, the burden of 
that program to the plaintiffs. In the present case,both plain-
tiffs and defendants would share the burden. Under the court's 
ruling plaintiffs would carry the entire burden including $70.00 
per hour for Clark's attorneys. There were no grounds advanced 
why that should be done. 
The trial court refused to rule on plaintiffs' motion for 
attorney's fees and expenses in connection with several discovery 
motions. Neither of these discovery motions were opposed. In 
one, Clark did not appear at all and the order was granted. In 
the second, Clark merely stipulated they would answer and made no 
objection. 
Rule 37(a-4) provides in pertinent part as follows: 
4. Award of Expenses of Motion. If the motion 
is granted, the court may, after opportunity for 
hearing, require the party or the opponent whose 
conduct necessitated the motion, or the party or 
attorney advising such conduct, or both of them, to 
pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses 
incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney's 
fees, unless the court finds that the opposition to 
the motion was substan~ially justified or that other 
circumstances made an award of expenses unjust. 
In plaintiffs' motion of July 18, 1977, they moved for an 
award of $171.38 expenses plus $258.00 attorney's fees in connec-
tion with the motion of June 18, 1976, and for the sum of $250.00 
attorney's fees in connection with the motion of May 9, 1977. 
There was no opposition to either motion nor was there any re-
buttal to argument that those expenses were not reasonably in-
curred and in fact the memorandums in support of the two motions 
took substantially longer than those attorney's fees would justify. 
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In Hurnphr ies Exterminating Co. , Inc. v. Poulter, 6 2 Frd. 
392, the district court of Maryland awarded $250. 00 attorney's 
fees of $25.00 an hour plus $17.00 train fare to attend the 
motion and stated that the expenses would be awarded unless 
the opposition was just. Since there was no opposition the 
court erred in failing to rule on plaintiffs' motion. For 
the reasons stated above, the district court's ruling should 
be amended. 
The court's failure to rule on plaintiffs' demand for pr: 
duction made September 16, 1977, is analogous to the preventior 
of discovery described above and relates to some of the sarne 
documents and also prevented plaintiffs from access to the onl; 
records available and relevant to the defects in the machine ~ 
volved in this case. 
POINT V. 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
BASED ON THE RUNNING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
IS IMPROPER AND SHOULD BE REVERSED SINCE FILING 
THE ACTION WITHIN TWO YEARS AS PROVIDED BY THE 
UTAH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, SECTION 78-12-28, 
U.C.A. (1953 AS AMENDED) IS NOT A CONDITION PRE-
CEDENT, NOR A LIMITATION UPON THE RIGHT TO MAIN-
TAIN AN ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DEATH, BUT IS MERELY 
A LIMITATION UPON THE REMEDY WHICH IS TOLLED BY 
REASON OF INFANCY OR OTHER DISABILITY. 
As previously pointed out, defendants Clark and ReynoNs 
are barred from asserting the statute of limitations for failur: 
to properly bring the matter to the court's attention in a time 
and appropriate manner. Even had they done so, would be to ask 
the court to accept new and sweeping doctrine which is incor.s1s· 
tent with the general laws of the United States, the laws of tf,, 
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state of Utah, and in particular, recent decisions of this Court. 
To hold that the statute of limitations ran against the five 
minor Switzer children two years after their father's death when 
the respective ages were between two years and eight and one-half 
years, and when there had never been a guardian ad litem or a 
general guardian appointed in their behalf, would deprive each 
of them of a vested right in this cause of action~ resulting in a 
denial of due process and equal protection and would be contrary 
to the clear and unambiguous language of Section 78-12-36(1), 
U.C.A. (1953, as amended) which provides: 
Effect of Disability. If the person entitled to 
bring an action other than for the recovery of real 
property is at the time the cause of action accrued 
either: 
(1) Under the age of majority; or • 
The time of such disability is not a part of the 
time limited for the commencement of the action. 
The simple, complete and conclusive answer to this conten-
tion is found in the very recent decision of this court in Scott 
v. School Board of Granite School District, 568 P. 2d 746 
(Utah 1977). That case involved a high school student who was 
injured during a shop class while a minor. The student by and 
through his guardian ad litem brought suit against the school 
district but the district court granted summary judgment because 
the student failed to meet the 90-day notice requirements of 
63-30-13. In that case, this court cited the infant-tolling 
provision in Section 78-12-36(1) and stated that: 
A minor is incapable of giving notice by 
the very virtue of his minority, nor may he 
bring an action in his own behalf while a minor. 
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He simply has no standing by statute and an action 
by or against a minor requires the appointment of 
a guardian ad litem. 
The parents, or natural guardians, have no 
specific legal duty to perform and have no respon-
sibility to their minor off-spring other than 
their moral obligation. Consequently, in matters 
of this kind, when a parent, natural guardian, 
fails for one reason or another to give notice, 
file suit, or otherwise protect the minor's legal 
interests, the minor is left completely without a 
remedy. This was undoubtedly one of the prime 
considerations which prompted the legislature to 
toll the statute during the minority of a claim-
ant against municipalities. Their reason for 
not so providing in governmental irranunity cases 
as we are faced with here is entirely unclear 
However, the general legislative intent to pro-
tect the causes of minors is abundantly clear 
by said amendment and the specific provisions of 
the general statute of limitations. 
(568 P.2d at 747-8) (emphasis added). 
Then, with a 4 to 1 majority held that: 
Notwithstanding the prior pronouncements of this 
court, a minor claimant is justly entitled to the 
protection afforded by said Section 78-12-36(1) 
U.C.A., 1953, in all cases including notice require-
ments of the type contained in the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. To hold otherwise is a denial of due 
process and equal protection. 
Applying the decision reached in Scott to the facts of 
our case, it would be hard not to cone 1 ude that the infant toll. 
provisions of Section 78-12-36 (1) tolled the statute of lirnita· 
tions as against the minor Switzer children. (Emphasis added) 
Moreover, there was no general guardian or guardian ad 
litem appointed for the minor children until this action was 
commenced. Therefore, there was no person who could properly 
bring the action on their behalf. 
There are several classifications of guardians. Tradit'.c 
the natural parent has been referred to as a natural guardian•· 
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inherent rights to custody and with certain parental rights and 
duties with regard to the care of their children. Natural guardiano-., 
however, have no right to interfere with the infant's person or 
property or to bring an action for and in behalf of a minor without 
statutory court approval. 
Title 75-13-3, Utah Code Annotated, before amendment, provided 
in pertinent part as follows: 
Guardians of property must be appointed by court. No 
person whether a parent or other person, shall have any 
power as a guardian of property except by appointment as 
hereinafter provided. 
The statute then provided for appointment of general guardians 
of the personal property of minors and guardian ad litem to defend 
the interests of any minor interested in any suit or matter pending 
therein. See Titles 75-13-5, 75-13-8, 75-13-12, Utah Code Annotated 
1953. 
Clearly, a general guardian or guardian ad litem would have 
the necessary statutory authority to bring an action for and in 
behalf of minor children for the recovery of damages for the 
wrongful death of their father under Title 78-11-7, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953. 
The state of law in this regard has been preserved in the 
Utah Uniform Probate Code, Title 75-5-201, which provides in per-
tinent part as follows: 
Status of Guardian of Minor. - General. A person be-
comes a guardian of a minor by acceptance of a testa-
mentary appointment or upon appointment by the court. 
The guardianship status continues until terminated, 
without regard to the location from time to time of 
the guardian and minor ward. (Emphasis added) 
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It is clear that Mrs. Bowles was a natural mother, a na'. 
or parental guardian with rights of custody and control, b~~ 
not appointed a general guardian or guardian ad li tern with aut· 
to bring an action in behalf of the minor children until Octob' 
1974, when this action was commenced. She clearly had no rigt: 
bring an action on the children's behalf for damages for the ,,~ 
death of their father. 
Moreover, it is clear that without specific legislative. 
the right to commence an action vested in the minor children s: 
not be abrogated. Utah Constitution, Article XVI, Sec. 5, reac 
pertinent part as follows: 
The right of action to recover damages for injuries 
resulting in death shall never be abrogated. 
With specific regard to wrongful death actions, this cour 
has held in Seely v. Cowley, 12 Ut.2d 252; 365 P.2d 63, and Pla 
v. International Smelting Corporation, 61 Ut. 342, 213 P. 187. 
that the statute of limitations for wrongful death cases is not 
limitation upon liability but only a lirni ta ti on upon the rerned,, 
and that consequently an action for wrongful death may be brouq' 
after the two-year period when there is an applicable statute 
tolling the running of the limitation period. (Emphasis added) 
In Platz, supra, the court held that the statute of 
limitations was tolled in a wrongful death case where the he~ 
a resident of the Kingdom of Hungary, pursuant to the tolling 
statute, Section 78-12-39 U.C.A. (1953, as amended), which pro· 
vides that the statute of limitations is tolled when the perso: 
is an alien subject or a citaizen of another country at war ~~ 
the United States. In Seely, supra, the court held that the 
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statute of limitations in a wrongful death case was tolled by 
section 78-12-35 U.C.A. (1953, as amended), which provides that 
absence of a defendant from the state tolls the statute. In 
Seely the court stated: 
The question to be determined is whether respondent's 
absence from the state tolled the provision of Section 
78-12-28, since there is no doubt the only action by 
appellant not heretofore voluntarily dismissed by her 
was commenced more than two years after the death of 
appellant's husband. 
It is respondent's contention that the provisions 
of Section 78-12-35 do not apply to a personal repre-
sentative because the limitation of Section 78-12-28(2) 
commences to run even though no administrator is ap-
pointed for the wrongdoer's estate. These cases held 
that the limitation of the time in which an action 
in wrongful death could be commenced was a limitation 
upon the liability as well as upon the remedy, and, 
therefore, the period of time in which the action could 
be commenced could not be extended even though no ad-
ministrator had been appointed. • • 
It is the appellant's contention that since an 
administratrix was appointed for the wrongdoer's estate 
that her absence from the state tolled the limitations 
of the statute just as such absence would have if the 
suit was against the wrongdoer instead of his estate. 
As authority that our court has not held like the 
authorities upon which respondent relies, that the 
liability as well as the remedy is limited to a two 
year period. Appellant cites Platz v. International 
Smelting Company. In that case, the court held that 
the statute which tolled the running of the statute of 
limitations in favor of an alien enemy likewise tolled 
it against the personal representative of the deceased. 
We are, therefor, inclined to view that that re-
spondent's authorities are of no aid in determining 
our question. Had the two-year limitation in a wrong-
ful death action been considered by this court to be 
a limitation upon the liability as well as the remedy, 
the alien heir would have been precluded from bringing 
her action after the two-year period even though there 
was a statute tolling the running of the time in favor 
of an alien enemy. (365 P.2d at p 64). (Emphasis added) 
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The Platz and Seely cases make it abundantly clear that 
the commencement of a wrongful death action in the two-year 
period is not a condition precedent nor a limitation upon the 
right to maintain such an action and the statute of limitations 
in Section 78-12-28 (_2) can be tolled by applicable tolling pro-
visions. 
The Platz and Seely decisions are amply supported by anal 
of the pertinent Utah statutes and the weight of authority elsE· 
where. 
The Utah wrongful death statute is found in Chapter 11 o' 
the Utah Code Annotated (1953) being Section 78-11-7. This sec· 
tion does not set forth any time within which the action must ~ 
commenced. 
The statute of limitations is set forth in a separate sta· 
tute, which is Section 78-12-28, in Chapter 12 of the Utah Code 
tated (1953). Chapter 12 is headed "Limitation of Actions,"~ 
Section 78-12-1 of that chapter reads as follows: 
Time for commencement of actions generally. Civil 
actions can be commenced only within the periods pre-
scribed in this chapter, after the cause of action 
shall have accrued, except where in special cases a 
different limitation is prescribed by statute. 
Section 78-12-28 of Chapter 12 provides in pertinent 
part as follows: 
Within Two Years. - ... (2) An action to recover 
damages for the death of one caused by the wrongful 
act or neglect of another. 
Therefore, it is clear that the two year limitation 
period for the cormnencement of wrongful death actions appears 
in the chapter of the Code which prescribes the time for com-
mencement of actions generally. The section also applies to 
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actions other than those for wrongful death. It is purely a 
statute of limitations which affects the remedy and does not 
condition or limit the right to recover for wrongful death which 
is created by Section 78-11-7 of Chapter 11. Hence, Section 
78-12-28 is subject to another statute set forth in Chapter 12, 
which tolls the limitation period in favor of minors, viz. Sec-
tion 78-12-36, U.C.A. (Emphasis added) 
Appellant contends that since the statute of limitations 
is found at present and in its previous form in the same chapter 
as the disability tolling statute for minors, they should be con-
strued together. Thus, the remedy is controlled by the statute 
of limitations but includes and is controlled by the tolling pro-
visions relating to the disability of minors. The Utah Supreme 
Court has previously held other tolling provisions of Title 78, 
Chapter 12, U.C.A. (1953, as amended) to apply to the wrongful 
death statute of limitations. (See Seely v. Cowley, 365 P.2d 63 
(Ut 1961) and Platz v. International Smelting Company, 213 P. 187 
(Utah 1922). (Emphasis added) 
Since the tolling section (78-12-36 U.C.A.) specifically 
provides that it applies to all types of action other than for 
the recovery of real property, it must follow that it also applies 
to a wrongful death action. 
Through clear, unambiguous language, the legislature pro-
vided that the statute of limitations is tolled for a person who 
was a minor at the time and when the cause of action accrued. 
The United States Supreme Court seems to recognize this 
fact in Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) describing the effects 
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of Section 15-2-1 U.C.A. 1953 amended upon Utah law. The cour: 
said: 
This is not to say that § 15-1-1 does not have 
important effect in application. A "minor" may 
disaffirm his contracts. §15-2-2. An "infant" must 
appear in courr by guardian or guardian ad litem. 
Utah Rule Civ Proc 17(b). A parent has a right of 
action for injury to, or wrongful death of, " a 
minor child." §78-11-6. A person "[u]nder the age 
of majority" is not competent or entitled to serve 
as an administrator of a decedent's estate, §75-4-4, 
or as the executor of a decedent's will. §75-3-15(1). 
The statute of limitations is tolled while a person 
entitled to bring an action is "[u] nder the age of 
majority." §78-12-36. Thus, the distinction drawn 
by §15-2-1 affects other rights and duties. It has 
pervasive effect, both direct and collateral. 
(421 U.S. at 17) (emphasis added) 
It is evident that as the legislature approached Section 
78-12-36 they had the intent to treat a person who is under the 
age of majority as having a disability and specifically provide' 
for the tolling of the statute of limitations. (See Scott, supr 
The statute is not just a random section of the code, but is p~ 
of an entire chapter which deals exclusively with the laws gave: 
ing the statute of limitations for causes of action in the Sta:' 
of Utah. There has been no significant amendments to Title 78, 
Chapter 12, in the period from 1953 to the present indicating t 
legislature's approval and satisfaction with the statute. 
However, in 1973, the Utah Legislature amended Section 
10-7-77, U.C.A., 1953, as it pertains to minors by adding the 
following: 
If the person for whom a claim is made is a 
mino=, then the claims covered by this section 
may be so presented within the time limits speci-
fied above or within one year after the person 
reaching the age of majority, whichever is longer. 
(See 568 P.2d at 747). 
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The ~ and Seely cases are not only sound decisions but 
are in accord with the weight of authority. In holding that 
limitation of action is subject to all _exceptions? 132 A.L.R. 
292 provides in pertinent part at page 310: 
••• where the limitation applicable to a wrong-
ful death statute or a survival statute allowing 
damages for death is a provision of the general 
statute of limitations, it is subject to all the 
implied and express exceptions applicable thereto. 
(emphasis added) 
This annotation collects and cites cases from many juris-
dictions and includes the Platz case. 
The general law on this point is also well stated in Corpus 
Juris Secundum: 
In many jurisdictions by express statutory enact-
ment, or by judicial construction, where the statute 
excepts persons laboring under disabilities from its 
operation, even if not mentioning infants specifically, 
infants are within the saving clause of the statute, if 
it is purely a statute of limitations, affecting the 
remedy and not the right, and the statute does not run 
against them during such disability, even where such 
infant has a guardian or trustee who might maintain the 
action in the infant's name, provided the title or right 
of action is in the infant. (54 C.J.S., Limitations of 
Actions, Section 235) (emphasis added) 
This reasoning is further strengthened by the reasoning of 
the long-standing precedent case of Brookshire v. Burkhart, 283 P. 
571 (Oklahoma 1929). In that case the court held that since the 
death statute was in the same chapter with the limitation of 
actions in general, which was created by the same legislature at 
the same time, the limitation period prescribed by the death 
statute was an ordinary statute of limitations and that a general 
saving provision pertaining to legal disability was applicable to 
extend the time limi ta ti on. 
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This argument under the Utah statutes is even stronger 
because of the fact that the right to sue for wrongful death 10 
-----in an entirely different chapter than the statute of limita~: 
and the disability provisions which are in the same chapter. 
In Texas Utilities Co. v. West, 59 s.w. 2d 459 (Tex. Ch, 
App. 1933) the court considered a case similar to the one at ha 
In that case the plaintiff brought suit individually and as thE 
legally appointed guardian on behalf of her two children for t:' 
wrongful death of their father, D. F. West. Mr. West died on 
September 30, 1927 and the suit was not brought until January:. 
1931. The lower court held the two-year statute of limitations 
had run against the mother individually, but regarding the su1: 
on behalf of the minors, the court held: 
The cause of action arising from the death of 
their father was a property right or an asset be-
longing to the minor plaintiffs, and the trial 
court held correctly that the suit of the minor 
plaintiffs was not barred by the limitation. (59 
S.W. 2d at 461) (Emphasis added) 
Thus the Texas Supreme Court viewed the right of the mine: 
plaintiffs to sue through a guardian ad litem as a vested prope: 
right or asset and was not barred by the statute of limitations. 
See also Buss v. Robison, 255 S.W. 2d 339 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1952) which cites Texas Utilities Co., supra, and holds that th' 
Texas 2-year statute of limitations for wrongful death actions -
not bar the cause of action of the minors in that case. 
There are other state supreme court decisions which al~ 
support to the Utah Supreme Court decisions in Scott, Seely, a;: 
Platz, which appellants submit are controlling on this issue. 
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In Cross v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 388 P.2d 353 
(Cal. 1964) the California Supreme Court reversed a lower court 
decision upon facts, statutes, and issues very similar to the 
present case. (Emphasis added) 
In Cross, supra, a mother who had been appointed as 
guardian for her three minor children, brought suit for the 
wrongful death of their father, George Cross. Mr. Cross died 
February 1956 and the suit was not brought until November 1961. 
In California at that time, there was a one-year statute of 
limitations for wrongful death actions contained in the wrongful 
death act which was in Section 377 of the California Code of 
Civil Procedure and the infant tolling provision was found in 
Section 340. In answer to the question: 
Was the running of the statute of limitations for 
wrongful death suspended during the period of plain-
tiff's minority? (388 P.2d at 345) 
the court simply quoted the pertinent sections of their code 
noted above, and held, yes. Later, in the opinion, the court also 
held: 
The running of the statute of limitations against 
adult heirs, therefore, does not effect the rights of 
minor plaintiffs in a wrongful death action. (388 P.2d 
at 354) 
In Parker v. Chrysler Motors Corporation, 501 P.2d 111, 
(Nev. 1972), the Supreme Court of Nevada followed the reasoning 
of the California Supreme Court in Cross, supra. The issue before 
the court was whether the two-year statute of limitations for 
wrongful death actions was a bar to an action commenced by the 
decedent's widow as guardian ad litem for the minor heirs of the 
decedent in view of the infant disability provision. The court 
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reversed the lower court's decision and in reference to the min: 
that: 
••• It is equally clear that the running of the 
statute of limitations is suspended during the period 
of their minority. (NRS 11.250(1),(3)) (Emphasis added) 
The California Supreme Court in Cross ~ac--G. 
&_E. _ _92.,, 60 Cal. 2d 690, 36 Cal. Rptr. 321, 388 
P.2d 353 (1964) rules on the very poings here pre-
sented and contrary to the view taken by our district 
court. We choose to adopt the reasoning of the Cross 
decision. 
In Sprecher v. Magsj::adt, 213 N.W.2d 881 (North Dakota 197· 
the plaintiff filed suit for the wrongful death of her husband, 
Virgil Sprecher, for herself and as guardian ad li tern in behalf 
her daughter, Kimberly, a minor. Mr. Sprecher died on December. 
1969, and the suit was not commenced until November 18, 1972. t 
trial court held that the two-year statute of limitations for 
wrongful death actions took precedence over the infant tolling 
provisions and barred recovery of both the mother and child but 
the Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed, stating: 
We conclude that the provisions of Section 28-01-15 
prevail over the provisions of Section 28-01-18(4) and 
that accordingly the time limitation prescribed in the 
latter section is suspended during Kimerly's minority. 
The summary judgment of the trial court dismissing 
the complaint as it relates to Kimberly Dawn Sprecher 
is reversed and the case is remanded for disposition 
consistent with this opinion. (213 N.W.2d at 885) 
(Emphasis added) 
In Gaudette v. Webb, 284 N.E.2d 222 (Mass. 1972), the 
Supreme Court of Massachusetts faced a case similar to the pre>' 
one. There the husband died on April 15, 1967, the action of~ 
surviving widow and three minor children was filed May 4, 1970, 
and the statute of limitations was 2 years. Al though Massachus; 
had always interpreted its wrongful death statute of limitatioro 
as a limitation upon the right and not merely the remedy, the 
Court held: 
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Upon consideration of the Moragne decision 
(Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 
375) and the sound reasoning upon which it is 
based, we are convinced that the law in this 
Commonwealth has also evolved to the point where 
it may now be held that the right to recovery for 
wrongful death is of common law origin, and we so 
hold. (Emphasis added) 
Consequently, our wrongful death statutes will 
no longer be regarded as "creating the right" to 
recovery for wrongful death. 
We further hold that statutes limiting the period 
for bringing actions for death are to be construed 
in the same manner as the limitations contained 
in G.L. c. 260, the general statute of limitations, 
and that in appropriate cases they may be tolled 
by the various provisions of G.L. c. 260. 
284 N.E. 2d at 229, 331 - (Citation added) 
The court using the above reasoning held that the infant 
tolling provision found in G. L. c 260 §7, tolled the statute of 
limitations for the minors in that case and therefore reversed 
the lower court's dismissal. 
For other cases holding that there is a common law rjght to 
a wrongful death action, see Barnette v. Butler Aviation Inter-
national, Inc., 39 N.Y.S. 2d 348 (1977) and Weinraub v. Interna-
tional Banknote Company, Inc., 422 Fed. Sup. 856 (1976). 
In Wilbon v. D. F. Bast Company, Inc., 365 N.E. 2d 498 
(App. Crt. Ill 1977) the court in a wrongful death action held 
that the two minor children were to be considered wards of the 
court whose interest should be specifically protected. The court 
noted that the 2-year wrongful death statute of limitations is 
found in Chapter 70, Section 2, and the infant tolling provision 
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is found in Chapter 83, Section 11. 
Then the court held: 
It is an exercise in illogic to assume the legis-
latur~ enacted section 22 of chapter 83 and then 
intended to negate it in chapter 70, section 2 ... 
(Emphasis added) 
In order to be consistent, we must conclude it 
is necessary for us to read chapter 83, section 11, 
together with chapter 70 to reach a decision. ]Ne 
believe the intent of the legislature to extend 
the time to bring an action for persons under 18 
years of age, as set forth in section 22 of the 
Limitations Act, is controlling and overrides sec-
tion 2 of Chapter 70, for reasons previously dis-
cussed. Therefore, we conclude the intent of the 
legislature, the case law and the public policy 
of Illinois, require that we reverse the decision 
of the trial court and remand this case for trial 
on the merits for the benefit of the two minor 
children. 
These rulings of the California Supreme Court, North 
Dakota Supreme Court, Nevada Supreme Court and the Supreme 
Court of Massachusetts, are consistent with the Utah cases of 
Scott, Seely and Platz in support of the proposition that t~ 
wrongful death statute of limitations is tolled by the plain ti: 
cause of action for recovery. 
From the foregoing reasons, the conclusion is inescapabh 
that the Utah Statute of Limitations for wrongful death is an 
ordinary statute of limitations. It is not a condition of lire 
tation of the right and is tolled during the minority of a pla: 
tiff by the provision of Section 78-12-36, Utah Code Annotatec 
1953. 
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POINT VI. 
PLAINTIFFS NEED NOT PLEAD FAILURE TO KEEP WORKMEN'S 
COMPENSATION IN EFFECT, BUT NEED ONLY PLEAD NEGLI-
GENCE GENERALLY. 
In Plaintiffs' complaint it was never specifically alleged 
that Reynolds failed to keep workmen's compensation insurance in 
effect as provided by 35-1-46 U.C.A. (1953 as amended). 
Plaintiffs did allege, however, that Gordon J. Switzer was 
employed by Reynolds and that his death occurred in the course 
of his employment. Plaintiffs' complaint in the first cause of 
action provides in pertinent part, as follows: 
3. That defendant BRYCE C. REYNOLDS is a resident 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and was formerly 
doing business as Reynolds Sand and Gravel Company at 
7600 South 20th East, Salt Lake County, Utah. 
4. That said defendant employed Gordon J. Switzer, 
now deceased, who was on the 24th day of June, 1963, 
in the course of his employment, operating a 175A 
Michigan tractor shovel machine in a westerly direction 
in Parley's Canyon approximately 15 miles East of 
Wasatch Boulevard in Salt Lake County, Utah. (Emphasis 
added). 
5. That the equipment furnished to the said Gordon 
J. Switzer by the defendant Bryce c. Reynolds was de-
fective, unsafe, inadequately designed, manufactured, 
maintained and repaired, and said employee was directed 
to drive the same on a steep downgrade over a distance 
of approximately 20 miles and on a public highway, 
contrary to the laws of the State of Utah. 
In the answer of Reynolds served January 17, 1975, the 
pertinent admissions to the first cause of action are as follows: 
3. Admits the allegations of paragraph 3. 
4. Admits that Gordon J. Switzer, now deceased, was, 
on the 24th day of June, 1963, employed by said defend-
ant, and that on said date he operated a 175A Michigan 
tractor shovel machine, but denies each and every other 
allegation of paragraph 4. 
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In October 1975 defendant Reynolds served certain inter~ 
atories on the plaintiffs. Interrogatory No. 1 provided: 
1. State with particularity the exact act 
or acts of negligence you claim were committed 
by defendant Bryce C. Reynolds which resulted in 
the liability claimed in your complaint. 
Plaintiff served answers to said interrogatories and supp. 
mented those answers on February 8, 1977. Plaintiffs'answer t: 
Interrogatory No. 1, above, was more than a page. Subsection": 
of that answer specifically states as follows: 
J. Violation of Utah statute 41-6-111- Coasting 
Prohibited; 41-6-144 - Vehicle in Unsafe Condition; 
41-6-144 - Brake Equipment; 41-6-155 - Requirement 
That Vehicle be in Safe Mechanical Condition; 35-1-12 
- Places of Employment to be Safe; 35-1-46 - Failure 
to Secure Compensation; 35-1-57 - Non-Compliance -
Penalty. 
In view of the specific allegation in the complaint that 
the injuries arose in the course of Gordon J. Switzer's employr; 
and the specific answers to interrogatories referred to above, 
Reynolds can hardly state that workmen's compensation was notr 
issue in this case. 
In view of the provision of Rule 8 (a) which provides onl'.· 
that a claim shall state a short and plain statement of the ell. 
and in view of the obvious knowledge of the parties that worJane· 
compensation was an issue, the plaintiffs ought not to be requi: 
to plead more fully and Reynolds can hardly claim surprise at t 
late date. 
Through an abundence of caution, plaintiffs at the hell~ 
of September 16, 1977, moved to amend their complaint to speci'. 
cally allege failure of defendant Reynolds to secure compensat: 
The trial judge never denied that motion. 
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The provision of Rule 15(a) which provides that leave to 
~end "shall be freely given when justice so requires" made it 
a clear abuse of discretion for the trial judge to fail to rule 
on that motion. 
C 0 N C L U S I 0 N 
Appellants respectfully submit that: 
1. There is a genuine issue of fact and the summary 
judgment granted by the trial court should be set aside. 
2. The defendants should be estopped from raising the 
defense of statute of limitations because of their failure to 
raise and plead said defense in a timely manner and the judgment 
of dismissal should be set aside. 
3. Plaintiffs' claim has not been discharged in bankruptcy 
as to defendant Reynolds and ·the judgment of dismissal should be 
set aside. 
4. Plaintiffs should be allowed reasonable discovery 
without repressive payment of costs, expenses and counsel fees 
and the court abused its discretion in failing to award plain-
tiffs costs and expenses in the depositions of its experts. The 
trial court's judgment of dismissal should be set aside with 
appropriate instructions. 
5. The plaintiffs' cause of action was tolled by reason 
of their infancy and the judgment of summary judgment based upon 
the statute of limitations is improper and should be reversed, 
since the statute of limitations is not a condition precedent nor 
a limitation upon the right to maintain an action for wrongful 
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death and is merely a limitation upon the remedy which is 
tolled by reason of infancy or other disability. 
6. Plaintiffs should not be required to plead failure~ 
maintain workmen's compensation in effect, but rather should 
only be required to plead negligence generally, but when a 
motion to amend the complaint by the plaintiffs is made to 
alleviate any question, it was an abuse of discretion for the 
trial court to fail to rule upon said motion. 
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